Last week, after the House health care bill was unveiled, the CBO released their analysis of the bill. In it was a few paragraphs on the public health insurance option that seemed noteworthy and puzzling:
Roughly one-fifth of the people purchasing coverage through the exchanges would enroll in the public plan, meaning that total enrollment in that plan would be about 6 million.
That estimate of enrollment reflects CBO’s assessment that a public plan paying negotiated rates would attract a broad network of providers but would typically have premiums that are somewhat higher than the average premiums for the private plans in the exchanges. The rates the public plan pays to providers would, on average, probably be comparable to the rates paid by private insurers participating in the exchanges. The public plan would have lower administrative costs than those private plans but would probably engage in less management of utilization by its enrollees and attract a less healthy pool of enrollees. (The effects of that “adverse selection” on the public plan’s premiums would be only partially offset by the “risk adjustment” procedures that would apply to all plans operating in the exchanges.)
This analysis confirms a lot of what I’ve been saying about the insurance industry. Even with regulation, they will continue to seek out younger, healthier people they can make money on, while dumping older, sicker people they lose money on. Risk adjustment mechanisms (such as those built into the House bill) can help mitigate some of this, and surely, stronger risk adjustment mechanisms may be necessary. But as usual, the CBO is obscuring the real story.
Jonathan Gruber, MIT health care economist, has put together a fuller picture of the CBO’s analysis of the public health insurance option:
In a letter released today, the Congressional Budget Office (the official government scoring agency) reported that they estimated the cost of an individual low-cost plan in the exchange to be $5300 in 2016. This is a plan with an "actuarial value" (roughly, the share of expenses for a given population covered by insurance) of 70%. In their September 22nd letter to the Senate Finance Committee, the CBO projected that, absent reform, the cost of an individual policy in the non-group market would be $6000 for a plan with an actuarial value of 60%. This implies that the same plan that cost $6000 without reform would cost $4540 with reform, or almost 25% less.
In other words, Gruber says the CBO has confirmed that even though the public option premiums themselves may be slightly higher than private premiums within the Exchange, the public health insurance option will act to keep overall premium levels down.
The CBO’s analysis of the House health care bill seems to confirm this, saying [pdf]:
"[The House bill] would also include a public plan that CBO estimates would place some downward pressure on the premiums of private plans operating in the exchanges.
While it’s hard to accurately predict what’s going to happen eight or ten years from now, the overall picture is clear. Put together, the conclusion by the CBO is that the public option works. Not only does it save money – $25 billion, less than a public option with negotiated rates, but still a chunk of change – but it holds down private premiums as well.
(also posted at the NOW! blog)
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If the Public Option lowers premiums or reduces costs, that’s great. But that’s not why we should do it. We should do it out of a moral obligation to care for people who are in need. This fundamental reason for doing health care reform is being lost in all this debate.
gruber’s paper is about premiums for people buying individual insurance policies. most people get their insurance through a group policy, usually from their employer.
massachusetts combined the individuals with the small groups [small employers]. according to one mass resident this decreased premiums for individuals, but increased premiums for those in small groups, not an unexpected result when combining a higher-cost group [individuals] with a lower-cost group [small employers].
it would be nice to have comparable data on the effect of reform on small group premiums [as well as the number of people affected in each classification] before getting too excited about this.
gruber:
of course an actuarial value of 60% means low premiums. that’s because such a policy doesn’t cover very much. it should be noted that because of ‘reform’ massachusetts offers a ‘bronze’ plan: low premiums, very high out-of-pocket costs. that’s cheap only if you don’t get sick with something serious.
so how much of the reduction in average individual premiums was due to more people buying what is essentially junk insurance after reform than before reform?
Rosenbaum cooks up some more bull. The relevant premiums are actually lower in the Senate plan than in the House plan, which means they’re certainly not primarily due to any public option in the exchanges. Gruber doesn’t say this, either, but rather just says they’ll be lower in general compared with doing nothing. The CBO was noting factors that might offset the higher rates in the House plan and mentioned the public plan as one. So yes, they do think the public plan will reduce rates, but it’s not the main reason for the reduction and Gruber is not saying that it is.
jeeze, we’ve already gone through some of the reasons the gruber report is nonsense. see this comment and others on the thread (i get tired of repeating myself).
in addition to the points khin makes (which i hadn’t considered — thanks khin!) and those from my previous comments, i have now read gruber’s report (his reliance on ahip numbers ought to be a clue about the reliability of his report), and the cbo letters he references (nov 2 and sept 22) and it’s clear he has misused the cbo data. i quote just this one bit frpm the sept 22 letter as evidence of my claim:
in other words, gruber used the info presented by the cbo in specifically the way they wrote it could not be used.
comment on a portion of the post:
uh, no. the quoted bit is taken out of context as it is comparing the house bill to the senate bill, and NOT as gruber purports to do, comparing the house bill to what could be expected absent reform.
the most bogus claims gruber makes are about MA reform, but since that is not the topic of this post, i will not pursue it here.
finally, i’m very glad that after months of arguing about it, the author finally concedes that risk adjustment and adverse selection are important to conisder, but otherwise, imo this post should be retracted.
No it isn’t. It’s just that we want to achieve MORE than that one goal. It’s a win win win win win win deal.
Great article! This is exactly what the public option is designed to do, but it’s no guarantee. The public option needs to be structured wisely or it will become all the things the GOP says it will. We need to clearly evaluate plans such as this for the structure of such an important program. http://cli.gs/z3AtaY/