Here’s something Senator Corker and Senator Shelby and the rest of the union-busting crowd ought to consider: the bankruptcy of GM will trigger the credit default swaps naming GM as the reference entity. A bailout won’t, according to the Bank of America.

The current gross notional amount of credit default swaps with GM as the reference entity is $44bn*. This is down from $65bn just three weeks ago. The net notional amount is $3.4bn, up bit since then. According to the DTTC, the notional amount is the maximum amount of money that will change hands on the occurrence of an event of default, after netting and application of collateral. The Bank of America says the cash requirement is around $4bn, again after netting and application of collateral. According to the Bank of America

"CDS contracts require daily posting of mark-to-market collateral posting," Taksler said. "Given that auto company bonds already trade in the $20s, the additional collateral posting prompted by a potential bankruptcy should be fairly small."

This implies that a large additional amount of collateral has been posted. That money is gone from the banking and investment sector, and isn’t available to be loaned out or otherwise put to good use. It is merely sitting in vaults, waiting around to see what happens to GM. Meanwhile, the price of GM CDSs has gone way up:

The cost to insure GM’s debt has surged to an upfront cost of 80 percent the sum insured, or $8 million to insure $10 million in debt for five years, in addition to annual payments of $500,000, according to Markit.

The rapid increase in the price of GM CDSs this year, coupled with the decrease in notional amount outstanding, implies that sellers of protection have been buying up protection in the over-the-counter market, presumably to set off against their sales of protection. The AIGs and Citigroups of the world are the sellers of protection, and they’re busy sending money to the buyers of protection, both directly through purchases of gambling CDSs and indirectly through posting collateral for their sins. And we all know where that money is coming from: Henry Paulson and Ben Bernanke. If the bailout comes, and the bankruptcy doesn’t, the prices of GM CDSs will fall quickly. The recent purchasers will be hurt, and maybe that will include AIG and Citi.

Corker and Shelby and the rest of the DC ignoranti need to think about this: who is benefiting from the bailout stall-out? There are a lot more games going on here than just Corker and Shelby’s effort to bust unions, and benefit the foreign manufacturers in their home states. There’s the whole shadow question: who will profit if the bailout doesn’t happen, and who will profit if it doesn’t.

This shadow question can’t be ignored. It infects every aspect of the whole bailout situation. Take Citigroup, with its $3tn plus in credit default swaps. Taxpayers are pouring money and guarantees into their treasury. Are they pouring money onto hedge funds and other buyers of protection, trying to prop up their swaps, or solving their exposure to GM and the other failing entities?

And, what about AIG? The Treasury is now participating directly in the shadow world, buying up securities insured by AIG through its CDSs, in the hope it will stop the bleeding of collateral. This is from AIG’s most recent 8-K on file at the SEC:

AIGFP, ML III and the NY Fed have entered into agreements with AIGFP’s CDS counterparties to terminate approximately $53.5 billion notional amount of CDS and purchase the related Multi-Sector CDOs. Of these, CDOs with a principal amount of approximately $46.1 billion settled on November 25, 2008 and a corresponding notional amount of CDS were terminated. Settlement on the remaining $7.4 billion notional amount of CDS is contingent upon the ability of the related counterparty to obtain the related Multi-Sector CDOs and thereby settle with ML III and terminate such CDS with AIGFP.

It is now perfectly clear that the Treasury and the Fed are afraid of failure to pay off on the gambling side of CDSs. That’s what the part about the related counterparty trying to “obtain the related Multi-Sector CDOs”** means. If the CDOs are worth 50 cents on the dollar, as this article claims, the Gamblers will spend $3.7bn to buy the securities, and trade them to the Fed for a like amount. Then they get to keep the collateral they already have, which we can estimate at $2.96bn. Nice. Those counterparties are sucking up taxpayer money on their CDSs. The insured parties, apparently banks, may be getting some kind of minor haircut, maybe 10%, according to the last link.

That’s more important than, say, bailing out the auto industry? Has anybody asked whether this is a good idea? Does anybody dare to ask? Who is protecting American taxpayers from the wolves of Wall Street?

*The link is to the current chart. I saved the earlier version, and can’t find it on-line.

**Multi-Sector CDOs are pools of other securities, and heaven knows what else.