The NYT tells us that bank regulators are examining the financial condition of 18 of the largest banks. Treasury Secretary Geithner says the regulators are going to do stress testing on the banks’ assets, telling us that the analogy is to the medical term. Dana Milbanks thinks this is funny, like because we’re all feeling so stressed out, so we need a stress test. It turns out that stress testing is a standard part of risk evaluation in financial institutions, and has a completely different and technical meaning.
Banks are in the business of taking in money in deposits and lending it out again, so when we think about the bank’s balance sheet, we would expect to see cash and loans. But it’s not that simple. One of the largest categories of assets of the balance sheet of a perfectly good community bank is securities bought and held for sale. This asset is about 14.2% of the total assets of the bank, and it isn’t just sitting there waiting for the market to go up. When we look further into the financial statements, we see the level of activity in the portfolio: during the 9 months ended September 30, 2008, about half of the portfolio turned over.
That was a small community bank. The Citibank trading account is $ 457.5bn at the same date and includes a huge portfolio of bonds, stocks, and derivatives, including credit default swaps. By the way, Citi trades that portfolio aggressively. The traders are the people demanding those crazy bonuses: they argue that they create the revenue and they ought to get a share no matter how badly the rest of the bank does.
Every bank wants to make sure it is taking special care with this portfolio, because the securities markets are risky. One of the main tools for managing the risk is called value at risk, usually shortened to VaR. Joe Nocera wrote an entertaining description of the theory here. One of the problems with VaR is that it relies on a form of the bell-shaped curve for its evaluation of risk. Nocera explains that VaR evaluates risk for 99% of the time, but it has no way to see what will happen the other 1% of the time:
The fact that you are not likely to lose more than a certain amount 99 percent of the time tells you absolutely nothing about what could happen the other 1 percent of the time. You could lose $51 million instead of $50 million — no big deal. That happens two or three times a year, and no one blinks an eye. You could also lose billions and go out of business. VaR has no way of measuring which it will be.
In part, this is true because VaR assumes that things are “normal”. One aspect of normal is the specific time frame for historical market data, and that tells us what is considered normal. Nate Silver gives us a simple example in Esquire. If we use a time frame of the last 60 years, we estimate the likelihood of a crash at 3.17%. If we use the last 20 years, we get .04%.
Stress testing is supposed to help solve the problem of what happens the other 1% of the time. It changes some of the risk factors in the VaR calculation to match some other hypothetical, like the crash of the Asia markets, or the sudden drop in the market in 1987, or the big oil spike of the late 70s or something like that. The literature describes several of such tests. I like this one from the European Union, starting at page 15.
Stress testing is expensive, and it suffers from two interesting defects. First, portfolios are evaluated using mathematical models, including the not-really-erotic Gaussian Copula. These models, in turn, depend on other equations which describe the risk in a specific investment. When a stress test is done, computer people fiddle with those equations, changing one or more parameters. That will work fine if the original equations make sense. But, if not, the new equations are junk, like the originals, or worse.
Second, it turns out that applying the tests gives an answer, but not a probability that the tested scenario will occur. The humans reading the results have to decide how to evaluate the risk of occurrence. This kind of evaluation is hard for humans, as Nate Silver described in the linked article.
Maybe we all need a cardiac stress test, after all.






42 Comments
Spotlight
Support this site!
Subscribe to the newsletter
Advertise on Firedoglake
Send
us your tips
Make us your homepage
About The Seminal
Advanced search
Thanks masaccio
digg is open
masaccio, your contributions are greatly appreciated.
This explains that “stress tests” are normal; Geithner emphasized the stress tests as though they were something new we would be doing — or at least news articles portrayed them that way. So how do you assess what Geithner proposed?
Were they not doing this before?
Are these just more stringent — wider range — than before?
Were we doing these but not paying attention to them?
What did he mean?
I think regulators can’t do stress testing as described in the materials I reviewed to prepare this post. It is expensive, because it requires someone to figure out the parameters that have to be changed, and then it takes time to run the new scenarios on all of the different securities and loans in the big bank portfolios. The new guys haven’t had time to figure out how to do this. Also, there is the problem of off-balance sheet special purpose vehicles, which Treasury realizes are a big shoe waiting to drop.
I expect that the regulators will evaluate the different portfolios of loans, securities, mortgages, and exotic securities with a sharp pencil, using uniform rules that will give a rough cut, rather than a more precise estimate of value. I expect it to be fairly harsh, judging by this quote from the NYT article I linked first:
This is also the view of Nocera, whose insight I respect, although he thinks regulators are unlikely to be severe enough.
I hope people will check out Nocera and Nate Silver’s article, which I think are very helpful.
The larger question is what we can do to move nationalization forward. I think we are going to have to pressure our legislators to grab the thorns on this.
I can give you my opinion. It is a scam. It is a way of not doing a real audit of the companies because such an audit (based on either pre-bubble or mark to market pricing) would show that the companies are insolvent.
A stress test, especially if it includes government backing, would pump up the value of holdings and show that the company was “solvent”. This would be based on over-valuing assets, which has really been the name of the game all along.
That’s a nice listing of areas of concern, but again if regulators really were coming at this with sharp pencils and a harsh outlook, Geithner would be moving toward nationalization or bankruptcy proceedings on the banks instead of the combined bank and hedge fund bailout he is envisioning.
I think nationalization is entering the realm of the doable. We need to keep these banksters in business to manage down the mess they have made, but taxpayers should get the benefit.
The cost to taxpayers of managing the assets of banks that have failed so far is high, but bearable. If we declared Citi insolvent, we would surely incur massive losses. Take a look at this from today’s NYT on the management of the assets. Look at the numbers of people being hired: 1500 by the FDIC, plus calling back retired workers, and hiring tons of liquidating firms and setting up new entities to work the trash off.
That’s just for the small banks that have failed so far. Liquidating Citi is an incomprehensible task. Nationalization is the only plausible liquidation method. It leaves people in place, with jobs, while we start the selling.
Banks have special assets divisions to cope with their bad loans, so we have a starting place.
I hope you are right about nationalization. But all of our elites, as the recent stimulus battle showed, are in complete denial about what is needed.
I mean in the stimulus debate I never saw a single article or heard a single politician discuss how many jobs we needed to create or the cost to do so, and how this fell out in terms of spending vs. tax cuts. I would think these would be the bare bones foundation of any such discussion. And as I said, I never saw them mentioned anywhere by anyone, except by myself and a few others around here.
As for nationalization you get inane comments about nationalization from Obama: it’s not the American way. What does that mean? He would rather a depression than putting the banks through bankruptcy?
Whenever I talk to anyone outside of fdl I begin by telling them that no matter how bad they think things are they have no clue to how bad they really are. It’s like being in a building that is going to blow up in two minutes but the authorities don’t want to tell the people inside because they don’t want them to panic. I think we need some real clear thinking and decisive action to avoid depression but I am just not seeing it.
masaccio, once more I would like to thank you for such remarkable explanations. These posts must require a ton of your time, but they really help me connect dots.
I’m in strong agreement with Hugh that there seems to be a huge fear of being frank with the public; however, I assume that Geitner is absolutely slammed with decisions to make, and being fed a lot of poor information.
It also seems likely that since much of the finance problem is related to fraud and risk taking on a scale and frequency there’s probably a great deal of pushback from those who don’t want to be held accountable for their criminal conduct.
I’m beginning to strongly suspect that we can’t actually address the economic problems until there are investigations (like Kerry’s proposed look at BCCI) and get a really, thorough timeline of who created CDOs, why they put them outside the regulatory structure, and who used them the most. (Yeah, I’m a dreamer…)
The other thing that needs to occur is a wider acceptance of the fact that unregulated markets are like sewers — the least ethical, most rapacious behaviors undercut everyone else and it’s a race to the bottom. Which is why I’m not at all surprised that’s where we’ve landed.
With that said, it looks like your idea is catching on:
http://www.calculatedriskblog……ation.html
readerOfTeaLeaves: thanks, I put in the part about the Gaussian Copula just for you, after your comment on my last post.
I think that Geithner knows what he has to do, but it runs so contrary to conventional political wisdom that he cannot bring himself to say it. I hope that the “stress test”, whatever the heck it is, reveals what everyone is saying: Insolvent. That reality will, I hope, drive everyone, including Geithner, to the logical and correct outcome.
I think if you add up all the signs, what we get is the following.
All the major banks are insolvent. They know it and Geithner knows it. Geithner also knows that if he publicly states that all the major banks are insolvent, it could trigger a run on the banks which would crash the US and potentially the world economy. So for now Geithner isn’t explaining what he’s going to do and is being exceedingly cautious about his wording. The foreclosure moratoriums that are just getting started are about building public confidence in the USG’s ability to manage the financial crisis and protect ordinary people. The stress testing is about providing cover for the nationalization that everyone knows is coming. Once the public confidence and the stress-testing paperwork is in place, the nationalization plan can safely be rolled out. Maybe a moratorium on large withdrawals will also be part of the roll-out, to avoid any bank runs.
But then again, I know nothing…
“That reality will, I hope, drive everyone, including Geithner, to the logical and correct outcome.”
Ah, the audacity of ‘hope’.
I add my hope to yours, masaccio.
At some point, the multi-layered or multi-storied ediface or mound of such hopes must rise high enough on the plains of denial that it is, at least, acknowledged as being there.
Perhaps we need to place a beacon on top?
As long as the ‘reality’ you mention can be denied (however successfully or unsuccessfully), we must assume that the vision of our sagacious Wisdoms is directed more toward the firmament than toward the crumbling ground upon which they (and the rest of us) are standing.
Perhaps, it all comes down to a question of ‘belief’?
A stress test will only give us a snapshot at a particular moment in time even if all of the mathematical models are spot on. There will be no reversal until a floor has been established. GWB claimed he raised home ownership to the highest levels ever but now all of his “gains” have been erased and is there a potential market? How is this floor going to established?
There are trillions of dollars on the sidelines waiting to buy assets from the banks. The banks do not want to sell at real market prices since it will weaken their positions in the financail markets. In real terms the bankers will no longer be the “Masters of the Universe”.
Hubris is stalling the economic recovery.
There’s Sam Donaldson on ABC opining that of course FDR didn’t pull us out of the Depression, WW11 did. News commentators shouldn’t opine on things they heard in the men’s room and don’t really understand.
Thanks, masaccio. I’m 2/3 of the way through the Nocera article and taking a bit of a break. An excellent article!
sorry to go a little off topic but I wonder if any republicans read frank rich from the new york times:
that frank, he done good
Good catch! Thanks. Makes my heart soar to watch them flounder. *g*
In fact, economically speaking WW-II was simply a massive public-works project, more massive than FDR could have gotten through congress over Republican protests. So, Donaldson’s hypothesis is even greater support for FDR’s Keynesian approach to getting us out of the Depression. (And it really pisses Republicans off when you explain that to them.)
I agree that the stress test is a snapshot, but the purpose of the testing is merely to see whether the bank is insolvent at that point in time. The bank thinks that while it may be insolvent at this point in time, that the market is undervaluing its securities portfolio, and that in time, the same securities that make it insolvent at today’s prices will recover value and make it solvent.
If the banks are right, then we don’t have to pour money on them right now. If they are wrong, every day we let them stay in business is a bad month in the future. It’s a dilemma.
Banksters v. Whistleblowers in a race to either destroy or save the world as we prefer to perceive it.
http://oxdown.firedoglake.com/diary/3667
Exactly. And, as political theater, Obama’s bipartisanship is working beautifully. There he is day after day trying to play nice with the GOP, and they call attention to themselves by refusing to cooperate, and with the most transparently asinine excuses and complaints.
The moratorium on forclosures is “until March”. How is that helpful? They just hold their forclosures for two weeks and then file them en mass.
But that is not going to be capable of being determined until you get down into the nitty gritty. Mathematical models will not get at the reality.
thanx adie, special attention to this which I forgot to highlight;
they have rushbo to thank for that, while bush was in office rush enjoyed almost as miserable approval polls as bush, I would venture the guess, if that same poll were conducted today rush would be reviled even more then bush
yet these republicans are in their bubble, they actually believe they should follow the putz that made 8 years of excuses for rove/bush/cheney
rush might be the biggest asset the democrats have for gaining even more seats next election
when you say his bipartisan is working beautifully, I guess you mean it’s working at gaining the democrats more support
there is no bipartisanship in the GOP, Obama working for it points out their vitriol and seems to be making him stronger
thank our lucky tubes for that
off for a top down drive on this spring day in the middle of february
Jane is upstairs!!!
I think that’s right, the models only work if potential purchasers have confidence in them, and there isn’t any good reason to have confidence.
For the mortgage backed securities, at least for pools of first mortgages, the cash flow might be a good predictor. We have had bad times in the past that might serve as the basis for a statistically accurate model.
That is less true of pools of home equity lines of credit and even less true of pools of unsecured debt and other pools of whatever new instruments are out there.
“Confidence” requires stability, the ‘belief’ that tomorrow, will, essentially, be like today …
“Models” which cannot accommodate “unimaginable” instability fail utterly, of course, when tomorrow is not just like today.
It is a bit like the regularly occurring ‘update’ that global climate change is happening more quickly than ‘anticipated’.
Is the problem the ‘models’ or those making use of them?
Again, it all becomes an issue of ‘faith’ rather than some unobtainable ‘certainty’.
The Wisdoms insist that we must stake our future (and that of the world’s capacity to shrug off our depredations) on a crap shoot.
Pure and simple.
When all ‘explanations’ become so complex that no one can understand them, then we shall have reached the limits of our ‘genius’ and, most likely, the proverbial ‘end of the line’ …
An interesting species, done in by its own cleverness.
what is said was that “as political theater”, his bipartisanship is working. It’s making him look good to the rank-and-file voters, and more importantly it’s make the GOP look like ungracious fools.
But any model is going to have to make assumptions about the future. Not only are these assumptions going to have account for a whole host of general variables but also geographical variables. Additionally, once these assumptions are made, policy makers are going to attempt to skew policies to the assumptions thereby operating within a box in the future.
Or, perhaps, policy-makers ‘believe’ the future to be ‘contained’ in the ‘box”?
And are sore amazed when it isn’t?
[All the while discounting the ‘effect’ that putting it (the future) ‘in’ the box sets up expectations about boxes …]
;~D
The solutions for the future are minimally contained within the box. Part of the process has to be debunking. This is going to require (unfortunatly) the failure of these elements that are contained within the box.
Yes.
I have read that “Bank Fees” are the main sourse of profit for banks. I say this just to let the bank employees who run the portfolios know that they don’t deserve bonuses based on their assumption that they are the main sourse of income. Google “Bank Fees”
here is a fantastic interview from Fronline and the preface that goes along with it.
I have this feeling in my stomach that I felt in other countries, much poorer countries, countries that were headed into really difficult economic situation. When there’s a small group of people who got you into a disaster, and who were still powerful. Disaster even made them more powerful. And you know you need to come in and break that power. And you can’t. You’re stuck….
The powerful people are the insiders. They’re the CEOs of these banks. They’re the people who run these banks. They’re the people who pay themselves the massive bonuses at the end of the last year. Now, those bonuses are not the essence of the problem, but they are a symptom of an arrogance, and a feeling of invincibility, that tells you a lot about the culture of those organizations, and the attitudes of the people who lead them…
But it really shows you the arrogance, and I think these people think that they’ve won. They think it’s over. They think it’s won. They think that we’re going to pay out ten or 20 percent of GDP to basically make them whole. It’s astonishing….
…these people are throughout the system of government. They are very much at the forefront of the Treasury. The Treasury is apparently calling the shots on their economic policies. This is a decisive moment. Either you break the power or we’re stuck for a long time with this arrangement.”
Bill Moyer’s Journal – Interview with Simon Johnson
Simon Johnson’s Web Site Baseline Scenario
Fees are a significant source of revenue for banks, but so far, are not the largest source. For CitiGroup, on a consolidated basis, interest income was $72.4bn for the first 9 months of 2008, compared with $11.04bn in commissions and fees during the same period. Take a look at footnote 5 on page 95 to the financials which discusses fee income.
What about data quality?
Before we even get to the problems of applying these “stress tests” to data about the banks’ assets, we have the prior problem of the quality of that data. Garbage in, garbage out.
One set of such problems has to do with old-fashioned fraud, as in lies. Several mortgage originators are already known to have systematically encouraged borrowers to lie when applying for mortgages. But suspicions of such fraud abound up and down the system, even where not definitely known.
These suspicions are based, not just on the old-fashioned fraud that is already known, but on the very structure of the new-fangled instruments and the markets for them. It is difficult to discern a legitimate purpose for most of these markets and instruments, and impossible to justify the amount of funds poured into many of them in terms of the stated rationales of legitimacy, even where these exist. We have, by report, 70 trillion in CDSs covering 6 trillion in mortgages, because… Exactly who is it that has 70 trillion worth of legitimate need to offset 6 trillion worth of underlying assets at risk?
But it is easy to discern that three of the characteristics these markets and instruments tend to share make them highly suitable to fraud and jobbery. They tend to be, to put it mildly, difficult for most of us, including most investors, to understand in their operations, implications and ramifications. This opacity, plus the fact that their very newness sometimes by itself got them out from under the oversight of a regulatory regime that wasn’t even bothering to keep up with established markets, made them difficult to regulate.
Thirdly, the opacity of these instruments, which tends to obscure the relationship of their market values to any inherent value of underlying tangible assets, when combined with the “intellectual laundering” provided by the mathematical modeling upon which their supposed ability to yield too-good-to-true ROI, created an uncontrollable tendency for these things to pyramid. It is worth remembering that the case that gives this phenomenon its modern name of “Ponzi Scheme”, did not, at least at its inception, involve any intention by Charles Ponzi to cheat anyone. He just thought he had found a way to make “free money” by exploiting an obscure technicality of the postal money order system.
Yes, the word “fraud” is perhaps too strong to accurately describe this situation, because no doubt much of this mess is not the result of people, at least at the onset, plotting to commit crimes and tell conscious lies. But “fraud” is also too weak a term to give a good sense of the scale of the lack of correspondence between market valuations and reality in a debacle that competent criminals intending to commit fraud would never have been so stupid to create.
However much of the problem is conscious deception, vs the “mere” self-deception of people who believed they had found a free lunch, the data in these markets cannot be trusted. That’s why these markets have ground to a halt. If confidence in the data was there, we wouldn’t need for the Chief Wizard of the Economy to wave stress tests and Gaussian copula in the air for these markets to move forward. Trust is not going to be restored by the application of this or that obscure statistical modality. Even in fields, such as the biosciences, where there has been much experience, and arguing back and forth, about the use of quantitative methods to approach as close as possible to the underlying truths, there remains some controversy over which statistic is appropriate to which particular sort of data analysis. Even if there were no concerns over the quality of the data, even the “right” statistical tool to best undertand the true valuation of a bank’s holdings would have zero chance of being newly accepted as such now, in the face of this crisis, when it had not achieved prior general acceptance and wide understanding in more normal times.
People aren’t going to trust the data in these markets until we send in the bank examiners and the FBI to do the forensics. This crucial step is what our current leadership has proven unwilling to take. Their reluctance is perhaps the strongest indicator that the reality is very, very bad. Maybe we do have nothing to fear but fear itself, perhaps there isn’t much fraudulent valuation in these markets, but if that’s so, the government had best start acting on that belief, and send in the investigators as the first step in letting the chips fall where they may.
Thanks, for the Coppula link, masaccio!
Strangely, I feel honored.
I’m not sure how I missed it, but the comment after mine on (what I think is) your previous Oxdown Diary — about valuing toxic assets — has a comment that I think is just brilliant (by wespeg) so wanted to note it here in case that commenter comes around.
Brilliant comment:
http://oxdown.firedoglake.com/…..ment-27995
Also, “Knut” pointed out in a comment on Galbraith’s 13 Feb Oxdown Diary that the kind of economic training both Galbraith and Krugman have is quite out of fashion these days. Evidently, there is a dearth of qualified economists trained to do the type of analysis that they do.
Too many economics PhDs, went to the Ferenghi Academy of Acquisition by Theft, Credit Derivative, and Copulating Stochastics**, and are therefore wholly unqualified to grasp the cultural, social, psychological implications of what we appear to be entering. If that’s whose in Geitner’s hiring pool, we are in big trouble.
**http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ferenghi
Please forgive my lamentable, pathetic efforts to inject a bit of morbid humor into this infintely sad topic of market meltdown by making at least ’stochastics’ sexy. One needs some glint of humor to contemplate such appalling disasters 8^0
This is an absolutely brilliant comment, also.
Please consider turning this comment into a separate diary.
And masaccio, this is yet one more instance where one of your diaries has generated comments and depth of knowledge that IMHO is breathtaking. The amount of ‘thinking’ that happens on your threads is… well, it’s in the EW and Jane Hamsher realm.
As you are probably aware, I have no higher compliment.
Thanks again.
But this analysis of poor data quality is a theme that I’ve encountered over, and over, and over, and over in reading about what’s led up to this crisis. And I have also encountered this theme in personal conversations with realtors, a lending officer, and two housing appraisers. Every one of them has raised the word ‘fraud’ in relation to poor information.