You could argue I suppose that the Great Depression was all Calvin Coolidge’s fault. When the stock market crashed and burned in October 1929, Hoover had not been in office even a year. He was just caught with the fallout, but it is what he did with that fallout that has so tied his name and depression together. Hoover was not a bad man. He was not a stupid man. But in the face of massive panic in the country he did far less than was needed. Even as demand contracted, his Fed reduced the money supply and he raised taxes. The results were catastrophic. And they persisted because Hoover followed the Conventional Wisdom of his times and persisted in the policies that produced them.

Today we have an economic crisis that has been called the worst since the Great Depression. We have a newly elected President with a marked tendency to listen to the advice of his Establishment. This time around we have a Fed that has greatly increased the money supply to no avail. We have much talk about the dangers of running large deficits. We have again a financial industry that has run amok. Speculation based on easy credit has blown up as it did 70 years ago. As then, we have entered into a spiral of debt deflation. The banks don’t want to lend to each other or really anyone. Despite the enormous shocks to the financial system, the banks and those who head them remain the same. They may be battered but they are unbowed. Their speculative philosophy is unchanged.

What has President Obama’s response been? Well, pre-election he backed Paulson’s $700 billion bank bailout program and his chief economic advisor was Robert Rubin, one of the architects of financial deregulation with connections to both Citigroup and Goldman Sachs. As Rubin’s star dimmed with the declining fortunes of Citi, two of his protégés Larry Summers and Tim Geithner took up the slack. The personnel changed but the ideas remained the same. Just as with Hoover, the overarching idea with them is that the financial industry is sound and will sort itself out.

Hoover was more consistent in that accepting that the financial system was basically OK, he took more of a hands off approach. He encouraged good behavior from institutions but he did not demand it. The Obama-Bernanke-Summers-Geithner team say the system is solid and then use this contention as a justification for massive intervention in the financial industry. Their goal is not to reform the industry in any meaningful way but to bring it back to where it was before the meltdown. You can see this in how they give little or no attention to the fundamental problems which produced the meltdown in the first place. We see a $75 billion program for homeowners and a $787 billion stimulus, but then we see a $1 trillion public private investment program (PPIP) and a $1 trillion term asset backed securities loan program (TALF). The point of both of these last two programs is to buy up the bad assets of banks at inflated prices. Indeed even the much smaller homeowner program (presented without cramdowns) can be seen as a means of supporting the price of these otherwise bad assets. In any case, the emphasis is very much on helping banks deal with these bad assets and not how they acquired them in the first place.

Today we heard the last component of the Obama Administration’s plan to deal with the financial meltdown: regulation. Geithner rolled out a program that was long on oversight, but noticeably weak on regulation and enforcement. Yes, he wanted the authority to take over any company that posed a “systemic” risk, but why did he want such power? He already has Prompt Corrective Action authority through the FDIC:

Each appropriate Federal banking agency and the Corporation (acting in the Corporation’s capacity as the insurer of depository institutions under this chapter) shall carry out the purpose of this section by taking prompt corrective action to resolve the problems of insured depository institutions.

Title 12, Chapter 15, §1831o, a(2)

This is power that the government has over banks that it could use but has not used. Why would Geithner wish to extend this power? For AIG? If you notice, we own 79.9% of it and we did not so much buy it as inform AIG it was bought. So again why is Geithner wanting more power when he isn’t using the power he has?

More importantly Geithner defended the most destructive and dangerous financial instrument out there, the naked CDS. At the same time, he made no mention of Glass-Steagall, the uptick rule, reform of ratings agencies, and bankruptcy and usury laws. At most, he made only vague statements about higher reserve requirements, but nothing again about the return to the net capital rule.

It seems that the talk of increased oversight is mostly a figleaf. After all, banks not only have oversight but also are regulated. Yet 18 months after the housing bubble went bust, we still do not know the losses they suffered from it. So you really have to ask yourself how much more extending oversight to other financial players, like hedge funds, is going to get you or how it will prevent this all from happening again.

And that brings me back to Herbert Hoover because just as he did too little too late, just as he depended on the sagacity of advisers who helped create the disaster, and just as he thought the markets were far solider than they were, this is what I see playing out now with Barack Obama. Denial is not a policy. It is a recipe for disaster. And like a recipe, it can be made over and over.